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This paper explores the issue of gender equity and re-assesses the likely experience of 
women under the new Australian industrial relations regime. Proponents of the 
changes have consistently argued that women’s position (as measured by financial 
and non-financial (eg. flexibility) indicators) will improve under a system ‘more 
responsive to individual needs’.  However, the data presented in this paper show that 
the biggest losers in the pre-WorkChoices system of individual bargaining have been 
women non-managerial employees on individual contracts. We extrapolate from this 
to suggest that this group is likely to see a further deterioration in their relative pay 
position over the next few years. We also highlight important changes required to 






Since the early 1990s Australian institutional arrangements for pay determination and 
labour market regulation have undergone considerable change. In a series of 
legislative amendments governments of all persuasions have sought to decentralise 
the level of bargaining and circumscribe the role of unions and tribunals in the wage 
determination process.   The latest set of reforms, however, go much further than any 
of the previous changes and significantly change the process and outcomes of wage 
determination in Australia.  
 
The stated goal for the new regulations, commonly referred to as “WorkChoices”, is 
to: 
…create a more flexible, simpler and fairer system of workplace relations for 
Australia. The Bill will carry forward the evolution of Australia’s workplace 
relations system to improve productivity, increase wages, balance work and 
family life, and reduce unemployment (The Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2004/05). 
 
In a radical departure from the arrangements governing wage fixing since 1904, the 
new regulation gives primacy to individual bargaining over collective bargaining.   
 
It is widely predicted that women will be significantly worse off as a result of the 
changes (eg. Plowman and Preston, 2005; WEL, 2005; Pocock and Masterman-Smith, 
2005; Peetz, 2006).  Proponents of the legislation disagree however and  point to the 
apparently higher earnings offered under Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) 
(federal individual agreements) reported by the Office of the Employment Advocate 
(OEA).  Other proponents have highlighted the relative stability in the aggregate 
gender wage gap over the last ten years, not withstanding predicted widening 
following the introduction of decentralised bargaining under the 1996 IR reforms. 
 
In this paper we draw on unpublished earnings data to provide an alternative reading 
of the “story’ as told by the OAE and to re-emphasise the financial risks for women 
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under WorkChoices.  We begin with a summary of the significant changes to the 
Australian IR system recently introduced through WorkChoices. 
 
2. Key Legislative Developments 
 
The changes introduced under the WorkChoices provisions are extensive and have 
been the subject of much debate and critique.1 For those with an interest in gender 
equity the changes are particularly relevant for several reasons. Firstly, they are 
relevant to legal requirements for gender equity within the workplace. The 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW: to which Australia is a party and which is scheduled to the Commonwealth 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984) highlights that the right to work and right to equal 
opportunities in employment, the right to equal remuneration and the right to 
promotion, job security, training and other benefits and conditions of employment are 
key elements of equality between men and women.  
 
There are also a number of national legislative and international legal obligations that 
require Australia to further the goal of equity in employment.2  These obligations are 
recognised as some of the Principle Objects of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth), which include “assisting in giving effect to Australia’s international obligations 
in relation to labour standards”; “assisting employees to balance their work and family 
responsibilities effectively through the development of mutually beneficial work 
practices with employers”; and “respecting and valuing the diversity of the work force 
by helping to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, 
                                               
1  By way of example, more than 200 submissions were made to the Senate Inquiry into the provisions 
of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005 (see 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/EET_CTTE/wr_workchoices05/index.htm). 
2 We are grateful to Jo Tilley from the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity for her advice on relevant 
international conventions. The following national legislation and international legal obligations require 
Australia to further equity in employment: the Workplace Relations Act 1996, the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986, CEDAW, the  International Labour 
Organization (ILO) Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration for Work of Equal Value, the ILO 
Convention 111 Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, the ILO Equal 
Remuneration Recommendation 90, the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Recommendation 111, and the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. The 
ILO Convention 156 concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women 
Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities, further seeks to create equality of opportunity between 
men and women workers with family responsibilities, and between men and women with such 
responsibilities and workers without such responsibilities. 
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sexual preference, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family 
responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social 
origin” (Section 3, (l) (m) (n)). 
 
The extent to which the new workplace regulations are likely to work for or against 
women is debatable, although the weight of commentary suggests a less than 
optimistic scenario.3  Features of the IR changes that are most likely to adversely 
impact upon women include:4 (a) new processes for the setting of the federal 
minimum wage; (b) the (restricted) minimum standards provided for within the 
legislated ‘Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard’ (AFPCS); (c) the primacy 
given to individual bargaining over collective bargaining; (d) the limited provisions 
provided for in the unfair dismissal/redundancy laws; (e) the reduced powers of the 
AIRC; (f)  limits on union power; and (g) specification of ‘prohibited content’ in 
agreements (i.e. content that parties may voluntarily agree on that may not explicitly 
be included in the formal agreement). 5 
 
The transfer of wage setting functions from the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC) to a newly established Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC), 
for example, limits the extent to which test cases may be used to advance women’s 
wages. The changes similarly affect the principles used to guide wage fixing with 
primacy to be given to economic considerations over other normative considerations 
such as fairness and equity.  Indeed there appears to be no provision on the new 
AFPC obliging an employer to offer similar employment conditions for employees 
doing the same work, thus putting into peril the concept of equal pay for work of 
equal value.6  The changes also remove the “no disadvantage test”, a test which 
                                               
 
4 For further details see Sara Charlesworth’s 2005 presentation on the IR changes and women workers 
available from http://www.cbs.curtin.edu.au/files/The_IR_Changes___Women.pdf .  
5 The Office of the Employment Advocate can refer any identified prohibited content in an AWA to the 
Office of Workplace Services for investigation.  Prohibited content relates to any clauses which support 
union influence in the workplace; provide remedies for unfair dismissal; are discriminatory or are 
matters which do not pertain to the employment relationships such as provisions which require an 
employer to pay unions fees from wages. 
6 For more on the principles historically applied by the AIRC and a discussion of the new changes see 
(Guthrie, Jefferson and Preston – WiSER discussion paper 49, as well as Preston 2001 (chapter 3). 
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required that those working under AWAs would not be disadvantaged by a shift from 
collective forms of employment agreement. 7 
 
With respect to the setting of the minimum wage the focus will be on limiting wage 
movements on the assumption that high minimum wages contribute to 
unemployment.  Relatedly members of the AFPC are not required to conduct a public 
interest test when considering their determination. Similarly there is no requirement 
that the value of the real wage be maintained.8  
 
In summary, the new workplace regulations establish the type of decentralised 
structures that have been associated with a limited capacity to ensure gender equity. 
This is coupled with few processes for monitoring the content of registered AWAs. In 
this context, the reports required of the OEA and the availability of official earnings 
data become particularly important in ensuring that Australia is meeting its legal 
requirements to further gender equity.9 
 
3. AWAs and Earnings  
 
Under section 358A of the Workplace Agreements Act 1996 (Cth), the OEA is 
required by legislation to present biennial reports to parliament on developments in 
bargaining for the making of agreements. The reporting function is carried out jointly 
by the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR), which reports 
on collective agreements and the OEA, who reports on AWAs. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the OEA does not collect wage information directly from AWAs for reporting 
purposes. Instead they use unpublished ABS data from catalogue 6306.0, a bi-annual 
publication. 
 
                                               
7 Once formed, AWAs are registered with the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA). While the 
OEA plays the role of registry of AWAs, it does not vet the agreements in relation to wage levels.  
8 Indeed, in the recent decision of the AFPC there is some debate as to the extent to which the 
adjustment is sufficient to accommodate recent inflationary trends, particularly for those on minimum 
pay scales of $700+ per week (see Davis, M.(2006) “Rise shrinks in light of inflation” Australian 
Financial Review, 27th October 2006:5).  
9 The links between gender equity and the new workplace regulations are fully discussed in Preston, 
Jefferson and Seymour 2006. 
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In their most recent report, Agreement Making in Australia Under the Workplace 
Relations Act (DEWR and OEA, 2004) information about earnings under AWAs 
occurs at two main points. Information for all employees is included in section 3.1 
(pages 83-84) while earnings information for “designated groups” of employees 
(women, part-timers, youth and people from non-English speaking backgrounds) is 
contained in section 3.3.  
 
The earnings estimates used by the OEA are presented in a highly aggregated form 
and, as we discuss below, do not facilitate scrutiny of differences between different 
labour market sectors.  The OEA also overstate the benefits of AWAs. For example, 
according to the OAE: 
“most groups of non-managerial employees on AWAs …had higher earnings 
than employees on federal CAs [collective agreements]. Intermediate and 
elementary clerical, sales and service workers, advanced clerical and service 
workers and associate professionals on AWAs earned more on average than 
equivalent employees on federal CAs.”  
 
The unpublished ABS data in support of this claim is reproduced below as Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Average hourly total earnings by occupation and type of agreement, May 2002 




All pay setting 
methods ($) 
Professionals 29.10 31.70 30.00 
Associate professionals 26.70 35.50 31.50 
Tradespersons and related workers 23.70 21.90 20.30 
Advanced clerical and service workers 22.70 26.00 21.40 
Intermediate clerical, sales and service 
workers 
19.20 20.20 18.60 
Intermediate production and transport 
workers 
21.50 21.00 20.20 
Elementary clerical, sales and service 
workers 
15.20 17.60 15.30 
Labourers and related workers 18.60 16.20 16.60 
All occupations 23.40 30.20 24.60 
Source: (DEWR and OEA, 2004: Table 3.1.6, page 84) (Emphasis added) (current prices). 
 
 
In Table 2 below we adopt the same format as that used by the OEA (2004) but 
restrict the analysis to “non-managerial employees”, defined by the ABS as 
employees who are not classified as managerial; i.e. do not have “…strategic 
responsibilities in the conduct or operations of the organisation and/or [are not] in 
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charge of significant numbers of employees”.10  We also include estimates from the 
latest, 2004, survey.  
 
There are two key points of interest. Firstly, for two of the occupational classifications 
which appear to have relatively favourable hourly wages in 2002, (Associate 
Professionals and Intermediate Clerical, Sales and Service Workers), the difference 
between AWAs and collective agreements is reduced when managerial employees are 
removed from the estimates. This is particularly the case for Associate Professionals, 
where hourly earnings estimates were reduced from $35.50 (Table 1) to $31.40 (Table 
2).  
 
Table 2: Average hourly total earnings by occupation and type of agreement for non-
managerial employees, May 2002 and 2004 




All pay setting 
methods ($) 
 2002 2004 2002 2004 2002 2004 
Professionals 28.60 29.30 31.00 34.20 27.90 29.60 
Associate professionals 25.20 26.30 31.40 (29.30) 24.60 25.10 
Tradespersons and related workers 23.70 25.60 21.90 (21.70) 19.00 20.80 
Advanced clerical and service workers 22.70 24.60 26.00 (24.90) 19.60 22.00 
Intermediate clerical, sales and service 
workers 
19.20 20.40 19.70 (19.40) 17.90 19.10 
Intermediate production and transport 
workers 
21.50 22.10 21.00 24.80 19.50 20.60 
Elementary clerical, sales and service 
workers 
15.20 16.60 17.60 (16.20) 15.20 16.20 
Labourers and related workers 18.60 19.40 16.20 16.60 16.30 17.60 
All occupations 22.10 23.40 24.80 23.20 20.40 22.00 
Source: Unpublished ABS data catalogue 6306.0 (current $) 
 
 
The second notable point of interest concerns 2004 average hourly total earnings 
(AHTE).  For five of the eight occupational groups AHTE for those on AWAs are 
lower in 2004 than they were in 2002. As the OEA’s report using 2004 estimates has 
not yet been realised there is currently no explanation offered as to why this may be 
                                               
10 The OAE purportedly reports on non-managerial employees, however, their definition of non-
managerial differs from that provided by the ABS.  Rather than exclude non-managerial employees 
from all classifications (as has been done in Table 2), the OAE simply excludes ASCO Code 1 
“Managerial and Administrative Employees”.  This is notwithstanding a clear ‘warning’ by the ABS. 
“Care should be taken when comparing survey estimates based on ASCO groups with estimates based 
on the managerial status of employees. Estimates for employees with managerial status include 
employees classified to ASCO categories other than the ASCO major groups “Managers and 
administrators”; eg. employees classified as “professionals” according to ASCO may be categorised by 
employers as having managerial status. Conversely, tables in this publication which contain estimates 
for non-managerial employees (as defined by employers) will include some employees who would be 
classified to the ASCO major group Managers and Administrators. (ABS, 2004:44). 
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occurring.  It may be that compensation is in the form of other non-wage benefits. We 
shall return to this point again later in the discussion. 
 
The OEA on Female Earnings  
As noted previously, women comprise one of the “designated groups” included in the 
OEA reports. Two tables that comprise significant parts of the OEA’s gender analysis 
have been combined to produce Table 3 below:  
 
Table 3: Female earnings by type of agreement 2002 
 Total weekly 
earnings ($) 
Total hourly earnings ($) 
 Female Female Male 
Federal registered collective agreement 600.40 21.30 25.00 
Federal registered individual agreement (AWA) 889.20 28.10 31.50 
State registered collective agreement 664.70 24.10 26.60 
State registered individual agreement 420.70 16.70 22.90 
Other 506.90 20.20 28.90 
All female employees 554.00 21.10 27.50 




The estimates included in Table 3 are used by the OEA to support two key claims. 
Firstly, the claim that “female employees on AWAs earned 32 per cent or more than 
counterparts on CAs” (this claim is based on the weekly wage rates)  (OEA, 2004: 99  
Hourly wage rates are used to support the second claim that: 
 “Female AWA employees earned 89 per cent of the male AWA employee 
hourly rate of pay. This compared to a female-male earnings ratio of 85 per 
cent for employees on federal registered collective agreements, and 77 per 
cent for all employees.”  (OEA, 2004: 99) 
 
 




Table 4: Non-managerial Female and Male total hourly earnings by type of agreement 
May 2002 and May 2004 
 Total hourly earnings ($) 
2002 
Total hourly earnings ($) 
2004 
Type of agreement Female Male Female Male 
Federal registered collective agreement 20.40 23.40 21.70 24.80 
Federal registered individual agreement (AWA) 24.70 24.90 19.90 25.00 
State registered collective agreement 22.70 24.60 23.80 25.70 
State registered individual agreement 14.70 21.80 26.40 33.50 
Other 17.50 19.80 19.10 21.60 
All female employees 19.10 21.50 20.70 23.20 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data (current $). 
 
Based on these data we found that: 
 When the sample is restricted to non-managerial employees, the apparent 
earnings advantage accruing to women in 2002 was 30 percent lower than that 
claimed by the OAE. In 2002 women non-managerial employees on AWAs 
earned approximately 21 per cent more that women on federal collective 
agreements, rather than the 32 per cent as reported by the OEA. 
 There was no evidence of a gender wage gap amongst non-managerial 
employees on AWAs in 2002; rather than the 11 per cent gender wage gap 
noted by the OEA. 
 Between 2002 and 2004 the gender wage gap amongst non-managerial 
employees on AWAs deteriorated by 19.6 percentage points to 79.6 per cent 
and was larger than the observed gender wage gap amongst non-managerial 
employees on collective (federally registered) agreements, equal to 87.5 per 
cent. 
A comparison of the estimates from both 2002 and 2004 suggests that AWAs may 
operate quite differently in feminised sectors of the workforce, an aspect we 
investigate more fully by considering different occupational groups in more detail 
below.  
 
4. Disaggregated Occupational Analysis  
 
In the following discussion we examine hourly ordinary time earnings estimates for 
non-managerial employees in each major occupational group at the ASCO one digit 
level (the exception applies to Managers and Administrators where the estimates are 
based on average weekly ordinary time earnings). We focus on hourly earnings 
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because this prevents the anomalous situation of comparing average weekly earnings 
for categories of employee comprised of different proportions of part-time and full-
time workers. We have used ordinary time earnings to prevent comparisons being 
affected by possible changes in the patterns of working hours, for example, increased 
earnings due to additional overtime hours. 
 
Figure 1 compares the gender wage ratio (common ratio of female AHOTE to male 
AHOTE) for AWAs and federally approved collective agreements over the period 
2002 to 2004.   
 
Figure 1: Gender Wage Ratio Within AWAs and Federal Collective Agreements, 




















AWA gwr-2002 AWA gwr-2004 CA gwr-2002 CA gwr-2004
 
 
The following features of the data are worthy of comment: 
 With the exception of two occupational groups (Managers and Administrators 
and Labourers and Related Workers), the gender wage gap amongst non-
managerial employees on AWAs deteriorated between 2002 and 2004. 
 The gender wage gap across occupations is persistent, significant and varied.  
 In 2004, the gender wage ratio amongst non-managerial Advanced Clerical 
and Service Workers was 78 per cent. The corresponding ratios for Associate 
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Professionals, Professionals and Labourers and Related Workers were 72, 78 
and 98 per cent, respectively.  
 Relative to non-managerial employees covered by AWAs, the gender wage 
gap amongst those covered by federal collective agreements was generally 
smaller.  
 
Research elsewhere has noted that observed stability in the gender wage gap is 
underpinned by a deterioration in the relative wage outcomes of men rather than by 
improvements in female pay per se (see Preston, 2003). Table 5 shows the relative 
earnings of different occupational groups benchmarked to Professionals and 
disaggregated by type of agreement.  In 2002 the AHOTE for female non-managerial 
employees employed as Labourers and Related Workers and covered by an AWA was 
equal to 49.7 per cent of the corresponding rate for female non-managerial 
Professionals.  By 2004 the relativity had improved by 6.3 percentage points to 55.9 
per cent.  Amongst male Labourers and Related Workers the story was markedly 
different, with the corresponding relativity falling 5.3 percentage points from 50 per 
cent to 44.7 per cent.  In Figure 1 the observed convergence in the GWR amongst 
Labourers and Related Workers covered by AWAs is underpinned by a deterioration 
on the relative pay of males (see also Figure 2 below).  
 
 
Table 5: Non-managerial female and male average ordinary hourly earning relativities by 


















Prof 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
A/Prof 99.3 83.6 84.8 86.0 100.0 91.2 84.7 88.2 
Trades 51.4 50.0 73.6 74.3 67.2 58.6 73.7 75.5 
Adv Clerical & 
Service 89.1 78.3 80.7 85.7 74.5 78.6 80.5 89.4 
Interm. Clerical, 
Sales & Service 68.0 65.4 68.0 72.8 58.3 55.9 66.2 65.8 
Interm. Prod & 
Transport 62.9 69.2 57.6 62.1 62.3 66.8 69.8 68.6 
Element. 
Clerical, Sales & 
Service 62.2 50.0 53.2 58.1 52.5 49.9 52.9 53.7 
Labourers & 
Related 49.7 55.9 56.5 64.0 50.0 44.7 59.1 57.8 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
Notes: AWA denotes AWA; CA denotes coverage of federally approved collective agreements; ‘f’ and ‘m’ denote 
female and male, respectively.   Professionals form the reference group.  
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Figure 2: AWA Wage Relativities (Relative to Professionals), by Sex and 
























Source: Table 5 
 
5. Summary and Discussion 
 
WorkChoices, and particularly individual agreements in the form of AWAs, have 
been aggressively promoted as an appropriate way of negotiating workplace level 
employment arrangements that allow ‘flexibility’ in the way employment entitlements 
are structured. WorkChoices will also purportedly deliver increased productivity, 
increased wages and allow workers to better balance work and family life. 
 
In this paper we review evidence with respect to earning outcomes and, using new 
unpublished data from the ABS, show that notwithstanding favourable claims from 
the OEA, women are likely to be significantly disadvantaged in a system where 
primacy is given to individual bargaining. Between 2002 and 2004 the gender wage 
gap amongst non-managerial employees on AWAs deteriorated by 19.6 percentage 
points to 79.6 per cent and was larger than the observed gender wage gap amongst 
non-managerial employees on collective (federally registered) agreements, equal to 
87.5 per cent. 
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Aside from experiencing a widening gender wage gap, the data also show that female 
non-managerial employees on AWAs also experienced a deterioration in their real 
wage between 2002 and 2004 with absolute earnings (at current prices) falling over 
the period studied. Whilst it might be that earnings have been traded off for some 
benefit (eg annual leave), research elsewhere suggests that the employment 
conditions under most individual agreements covering non-managerial employees are 
inferior to awards (Plowman and Preston 2005; ACRRIT 2002: 64-65). 
   
In short, available data demonstrate that some employees on AWAs appear to receive 
benefits in terms of increased earnings. However, the effects of AWAs vary markedly 
between occupational groups and across time. It appears that longer term benefits in 
the form of higher earnings are restricted to those in relatively favourable labour 
market positions, most notably those in administrative and managerial roles. Those 
who have traditionally been reliant on minimum award conditions to provide their 
standard employment entitlements, particularly women in non-managerial roles are 
not maintaining their earnings position. Further, it is unlikely that current data sources 
will be adequate for monitoring their position if trade offs between earnings and other 
entitlements become prevalent under the new WorkChoices arrangements. This may 
have significant implications for gender equity in the labour market as AWAs become 
more widely used. It is an issue that will require regular, appropriate data for 
monitoring future developments in order to encourage fairness and equity. 
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